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I.

State Insurance Fund Admits that Express Notice On The Issue Of Causation Was Not
Given.

State Insurance Fund admits that causation was not an expressed issue at hearing.
(Respondent Brief, p. 12).

Its attempt to boot strap it as an issue by arguing that the issue was

"reasonable and necessary medical care ... and the extent thereof' simply does not wash. It wrote:
"The only review the Commission is entitled to make is whether treatment was reasonable." It then
cited to Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 770 P.2d 395 (1989) and argued
against reasonableness. (Respondent LC. Hearing Brief, p. 6).
The Commission totally ignored this stipulation of counsel and opted instead to address
causation. A stipulation is a "voluntary agreement between opposing counsel concerning disposition
of some relevant point so as to obviate need for proof or to narrow range of litigable issues." Blacks
Law Dictionary 5 th Ed., sv "Stipulation." State Insurance Fund cites no authority that a stipulation
of the parties can be ignored by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission cannot
ignore a Stipulation or insert an issue not expressly agreed to be tried by the parties. Hernandez v.
Philips, 141 Idaho 779,781, 118P.3d 111 (2005).

State Insurance Fund also cites to the recent case Fife v. Home Depot, Inc., 2011 Opinion No.
92 (September 2, 2011), for the proposition that it aligns with Henderson v. McCain Foods, 142,
Idaho 559, 130 P.2d 1097 (2006), in that causation must be proved before medical reasonableness
can be established. It is true Henderson and Fife are alike, but not for the proposition for which it
states, but rather for the proposition that an issue of causation must first be "noticed up" by the
Industrial Commission and then argued by the parties. Like Henderson, Claimant Fife made a
request for a hearing on the issue of causation and reasonable medical care. The evidence included
testimony of "the physician who performed the independent medical exam" who concluded that
APPELLATE'S REPLY BRIEF - I

claimant's need for surgery was not related to the industrial accident and "claimant's surgeon" who
opined that the industrial accident was related to his need for surgery because it exacerbated his
condition (Fife, p. 2). After addressing causation, the Commission concluded that "Claimant had
failed to prove that the medical condition for which he had surgery was causally related to the
industrial accident or that the accident aggravated his pre-existing degenerative condition." (Id.,
Emphasis added).

In contrast, to Fife, Gomez did not submit proof relating to causation because it was not
raised by or agreed to as an issue by the Industrial Commission or the parties.

II.

State Insurance Fund's Argument Rewrites Idaho Code§ 72-432.
Idaho Code § 72-432 is clear and unambiguous: "the employer shall provide for the injured

employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendants or treatment, nurse and hospital
service, medicine crutches and apparatus as may be reasonably required by the employee's
physician or needed immediately after an injury ... and for a reasonable time thereafter." There
is no causation language attached to Idaho Code§ 72-432. Without going through proper legislature
repeal or amendment, State Insurance Fund would have the statute read "that the employer shall
never be required to provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other
attendants or treatment ... until and unless Claimant proves a causal relationship for each and every
treatment."

With this tortured interpretation an unbearable burden is placed on Claimant. For

example, a Claimant who is prescribed daily physical therapy would be required to submit proof
of cause after each and every treatment in order to justify more treatment. Would State Insurance
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Fund really expect "causation" paperwork to be submitted daily to substantiate treatment? This is
impractical. This is not the intent ofldaho Code § 72-432.

III.

Claimant Did Not Ar~ue Causation in its Brief.

Contrary to State Insurance Fund's argument, Gomez never addressed causation in her Brief.
There was no need. State Insurance Fund paid for additional treatment to Gomez's treating
physician, Dr. Jake Poulter on July 22, 2010, long after the February 2010 opinion of Dr. David
Simon. (Gomez Ex. 7). This alone is evidence that causation was not an issue in mind. It is true,
Gomez's medical records were admitted into evidence, but not referenced for the issue of proving
cause, but of reasonableness in accord with Sprague.
Had Gomez known that causation was an issue to be determined by the Commission it would
have presented her case much differently. Rather than permitting medical records to speak for
themselves, which is sufficient to prove reasonableness of treatment, Gomez would have taken the
deposition of Dr. Poulter or Dr. Huneycutt or a radiologist to explain "cause". "Cause" in this case
would focus on the MRI, the "objective" evidence. Without narrative, it reveals a "tear in the
annulus fibrosis" and "disc protrusion." (Defendants Exhibit C, p. 5). Any credible physician must
admit that an MRI is an instant snap shot in time. The fact that one physician, whether it be a
radiologist or otherwise, does not see a disc impingement on the MRI does not mean Claimant has
no impingement or symptoms. The dynamic nature of the body, whether it is positional or
gravitational, may immediately create a condition in which the disc is impinged and then relieved.
Moreover, physicians may disagree on what each may "see" on an MRI. Thus, the "objective"
evidence of the MRI, though important, is not conclusive and clinical correlation is always indicated
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in such settings. Because there was no intervening or independent accident or occurrence which took
place between treatment dates, causing new symptoms, it stands to reason, Gomez's work accident
continued to cause symptoms. Even though he acknowledged this, State Insurance Fund's expert
Dr. Simon, declared that her symptoms were not related to the work injury. Yet in the same breath,
he did not assign a "cause" leaving it "unable to be determined." (Defendants' Exhibit A, p. 5).
This type of testimony calls for intense cross examination which must be bolstered by Gomez's
expert opinions to establish cause. This opportunity was not afford to Gomez.

IV.

Public Policy Considerations.
Legislative intent as to the value ofldaho's workers is expressly set forth in Idaho Code§

72-201:
The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against
employers for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted
in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modern industrial
conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries
and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of
Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power,
declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private
controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen and
their families and dependents is hereby provided ... (emphasis
added).
The exclusiveness of an employee's remedy in comp law is fixed, subject only to third party
claims as referenced in Idaho Code§ 72-223. To assure that the legislature means business, it added
a stiff penalty for employers who fail to insure liability. (See Idaho Code § 72-210).
The liberality of the statutes in favor of the injured workman has been reiterated by this court,
but none more succinctly stated as in Steinebach:
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Among the primary duty of an employer to an injured workmen is to furnish
him reasonable medical, surgical or other treatment necessary to rehabilitate
him and as far as possible, restore his health, usefulness and earning capacity
... one of the principal requirements of the workman compensation law is
that insofar as possible, the injured workman shall be restored to health by
reasonable and proper treatment ... and workers compensation law shall be
liberally construed in favor of the injured workman. Steinebach v. Hoff
Lumbar, Co., 98 Idaho 428,431, 432, 566 P.2d 377 (1977).
Defendants argument, if accepted at face value, cuts the heart out of work comp law, which
is timely and reasonable treatment be provided to injured workers. Currently, the practice of
treatment follows the scheme as outlined by Idaho Code § 72-432 and is premised upon
reasonableness. Appropriately this may be called the "causation presumption." For example,
though an emergency room report does not specify or note a causal link between an injured employee
suffering from a penetrating wound, a broken bone, or an acute or debilitating back or neck injury
caused by a blow or fall, causation is presumed. The Surety then pays the bills on the basis of
reasonableness. Thereafter, it continues to pay for subsequent treatment such as follow up care,
medication, x-rays, physical therapy, etc., under that same presumption. This is the practical,
understandable and real world approach to payment made for medical care as outlined in Idaho Code
§ 72-432.
Only in the event that a Surety chooses to challenge reasonableness of care by establishing
an expert opinion contrary to it or to challenge causation in order to terminate benefits must one or
both of these issues be addressed. This way issues of causation and/or reasonableness remain
distinct and separate or by agreement may be addressed together.

If Defendants' argument is accepted, then the Surety may refuse to pay medical treatment
because a Claimant had not established, in every treatment scenario a statement eluding to or
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providing a causal link between the treatment and the injury. Worse yet, a Surety could issue denials
"en masse" and make them retroactive and/or call for reimbursement of payments made to medical
providers because "cause" has not been established. What would stop this travesty?
The current trend in the industry is that a Surety will use an IME physician who practices
in the same geographic area to render opinions on treatment, cause, stability, impairment, etc. For
example, in Southeast Idaho, Dr. Simon and Dr. Knoebel get the call; in Ada County it appears to
be Dr. Richard Wilson. When an IME exam is contrary to the treating physician's opinion (almost
always), and a denial of treatment is issued, a Claimant must then seek private insurer payment (if
such is available) or rush to qualify for state or federal assistance in order to pay for treatment. In
a denied case, a Claimant still remains injured and unemployed and without immediate recourse, and
usually a hearing takes months from the denial date. This is bad enough. But if a Claimant does not
get a fair hearing, it is tragic. So much for sure and certain relief!
Claimant and defense bar, the Industrial Commission, and this Court must wrestle with this
very real issue with real consequences and decide which path to take: deny Claimant hearing access
or permit it on stated issues. Fortunately, the path is clear. The Legislature paved the way in Idaho
Code§ 72-708. The hearing process and procedure should be "summary and simple." "Rules of
equity" require that Claimant be provided notice and the opportunity to present evidence on
causation.
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V.

Conclusion.
Gomez requests that this Court follow constitutional and statutory law and to expressly

declare that the issue of causation must be specifically and expressly "noticed up" in accord with
Idaho Code§ 72-713.
Gomez requests that this Court uphold Idaho Code § 72-432 which requires or infers that
once the employer has commenced payment for Claimant's medical care, a "presumptive chain of
causation" is established and this chain cannot be broken absent a physician opinion to the contrary.
Gomez requests this Court clarify its ruling in Henderson and F(fe, holding that the issue of
causation or reasonableness - - or both is permitted and that causation is not required to be addressed
in every instance before the issue of reasonableness is addressed.
Accordingly, Claimant requests the Commission to reverse and remand so that additional
evidence can be presented on the issue of causation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

12 day of October, 2011.

MCBRIDE & ROBERTS, ATTORNEYS

L

cBride
Attorney for Claimant
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